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Abstract
Cooperation between firms can never improve the technical effi-
ciency of any firm coalition. The directional distance function, by
virtue of its additive nature, is a useful tool that outlines this impossi-
bility. In this paper, the additive aggregation scheme of input/output
vectors is generalized according to an aggregator. Accordingly, coop-
eration between firms may increase the technical efficiency of the firm
group. This improvement is shown to be compatible with nonjoint
semilattice technologies that bring out either output or input (weak)
complementarity. Firm games are investigated to show that firms may
merge on the basis of their inputs due to constraints imposed on out-
puts. Conversely, they may merge with respect to the outputs they
can produce because of limitations imposed on inputs.
Keywords: Productivity and competitiveness, Aggregation, Cooperative
games, Distance functions, Technical efficiency.
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1 Introduction
The cooperation between firms can never improve the technical efficiency of
any given firm coalition (industry). This impossibility has become a stan-
dard result in the productivity measurement literature, see Briec, Dervaux
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and Leleu (2003) or Fa¨re, Grosskopf and Zelenyuk (2008). The firm game is
the transferable utility game (TU-game) that exhibits this impossibility (see
Briec and Mussard, 2014), in other words, the core interior of the firm game
is empty (see also DEA production games introduced by Lozano (2012, 2013)
in which different organizations have the possibility to merge). The result is
derived from the directional distance function applied to the technology at
the industry level, which relies on the standard sum of technology sets, see
e.g. Fa¨re, Grosskopf and Li (1992) and Li and Ng (1995). Li and Ng (1995)
demonstrate that the standard sum of technology sets may yield different
results, particularly a bad representation of the technical efficiency of the
industry. In other words, the choice of the aggregation process, for aggregat-
ing input/outputs vectors, or equivalently aggregating technologies of firms,
has a crucial impact on productivity measurement. In firm games, Briec and
Mussard (2014) show that any given firm coalition may always increase its al-
locative efficiency if the input/output vectors are simply aggregated with the
standard sum. However, the impossibility of improving technical efficiency
holds true, i.e., the inefficiency of the industry is always greater than the sum
of the inefficiencies of each firm. In other words, the technical bias that rep-
resents the difference between the two aforementioned inefficiencies is always
positive. Coalitions of firms are said to be sub-efficient because firm coop-
eration increases the technical inefficiency of the group. As a consequence,
the core interior of the firm game is empty: no firm can improve its technical
efficiency by joining any given coalition. As pointed out by a referee, there is
another interpretation when the sum of the individual firms’ inefficiencies is
lower than the inefficiency of the aggregate operating point measured on the
aggregate technology. This means that ”the cooperation associated to the
aggregate technology allows finding efficient operation points that can lead
to more inefficiencies removal and hence to a larger efficiency improvement
than what is possible for the individual firms.” Following this interpretation,
when the core interior is empty, then there exists no blocking coalition for
which the aggregate technology exhibits efficient operations points.
In this paper, the aggregation of technology sets is generalized thanks
to a Φα-aggregator inspired from Ben-Tal (1977) who studied its algebraic
properties underlying the generalized mean introduced by Hardy, Littlewood
and Po´lya (1934) and characterized by Acze´l (1966) and Eichorn (1979). The
aggregation bias, i.e. the difference between the inefficiency of the firm coali-
tion and the sum of each firm’s inefficiency, takes different forms with respect
to the nature of the aggregator Φα. (i) If the bias is positive, the coopera-
tion between firms is impossible. (ii) If the bias is negative, the aggregate
inefficiency of any given coalition of firms decreases with cooperation. To
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study the sign of the aggregation bias, two limit cases – in the neighborhood
of infinity – allow Kholi’s (1983) nonjoint technology to be characterized for
a group of firms. This coalitional technology is shown to be consistent with
the traditional assumptions of the literature. It is an upper (lower) semi-
lattice satisfying a free disposal assumption with either complementarity in
outputs or in inputs. It is shown that this aggregated technology enables
the paradox of the positive technical bias to be solved. Indeed, the negative
bias is obtained by specifying two firm games, the input fixed firm game
and the output fixed firm game. The input fixed firm game postulates that
the cooperation between firms is related to the use of inputs only, because
some production constraints are imposed on the industrial sector to limit
the number of outputs (production quota). The output fixed firm game al-
lows the amount of outputs to be improved when the firms are limited by
a given amount of inputs (resource limitations). These results are derived
using the directional distance function, introduced by Chambers, Chung and
Fa¨re (1996, 1998), applied on aggregated data.1 The input [output] fixed firm
game defined on aggregated upper semilattice technologies yields a negative
[positive] bias. On the contrary, the output [input] fixed firm game defined
on aggregated lower semilattice technologies yields a negative [positive] bias.
Finally, if the directional distance function defined on semilattice technolo-
gies is submodular, then the core of the firm game may be partitioned in
order to find aggregate operating points measured on the aggregate semilat-
tice technology for which the cooperation between firms improves technical
efficiency (negative bias). In this sense, the aim of this paper is to find theo-
retical conditions, i.e. aggregators for technologies of firm groups giving rise
to particular directional distance functions, that provide an improvement of
technical efficiency (that is the non-vacuity of the core of the game).
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets the notations and
the motivations. Section 3 is devoted to the definitions of the aggregated
technologies with examples of negative technical bias. Section 4 presents the
characterization of nonjoint aggregated semilattice technologies with either
input or output (weak) complementarity. Section 5 explores the negative
bias supported by the directional distance function in firm games. Section
6 provides an example of firm games that outlines a negative technical bias.
Section 7 closes the article.
1See also the benefit function of Luenberger (1992, 1995).
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2 Setup and Motivations
The set of firms (players) is K := {1, . . . , |K|}, where |K| ≡ #{K}. The
subsets of the grand coalition K are denoted by S such that S ⊆ K. The
interior of a set E is
◦
E, R+ is the non-negative part of the real line and R++
its positive part (with Rn+ and Rn++ its n-dimensional representation). 0n [0m]
is the n-dimensional [m-dimensional] vector of zeros, 1 d is the d-dimensional
vector of ones, N the set of weakly positive integers, ≥ [≤] denotes inequalities
over scalars and > [6] over vectors, and finally [d] := {1, . . . , d} with d ∈
N \ {1}.
The firms use inputs and produce outputs. Let x ∈ Rn+ and y ∈ Rm+ be
the input and output vectors, respectively. These vectors will be sometimes
denoted by z := (x, y) ∈ Rd+ with d = n+m. The firm technology T satisfies
the following basic assumptions:
(T1): (0n, 0m) ∈ T , (0n, y) ∈ T =⇒ y = 0m i.e., no free lunch;
(T2): the set A(x) = {(u, y) ∈ T : u 6 x} of dominating observations is
bounded for all x ∈ Rn+, i.e., infinite outputs cannot be obtained from a finite
input vector;
(T3): T is closed;
(T4): ∀z = (x, y) ∈ T , (x,−y) 6 (u,−v) =⇒ (u, v) ∈ T , i.e., fewer
outputs can always be produced with more inputs;
(T5): ∀β ≥ 0, if (x, y) ∈ T then (βx, βy) ∈ T , i.e. the technology
satisfies constant returns to scale. Although this assumption is not central
in the paper, we will prove that the technology proposed in Section 4 may
respect this requirement.
Given a production set one can define an input correspondence L : Rm+ −→
2R
n
+ and an output correspondence P : Rn+ −→ 2Rm+ such that:
T =
{
(x, y) ∈ Rn+m+ : x ∈ L(y)
}
=
{
(x, y) ∈ Rn+m+ : y ∈ P (x)
}
. (2.1)
The literature on the aggregation of technologies (see e.g. Li, 1995; Li
and Ng, 1995) defines the technology of the grand coalition as a standard
sum of input and output vectors. Let (xk, yk) ∈ Rn+m+ be the input-output
vectors of firm k whose technology is T k. Following this specification, the
technology of any given coalition S is the standard sum of the technologies
T k of each firm k ∈ S:
T S :=
∑
k∈S
T k =
{(∑
k∈S
xk,
∑
k∈S
yk
)
: (xk, yk) ∈ T k, k ∈ S
}
. (2.2)
Any given technology enables the technical efficiency of the firms to be
measured thanks to distance functions (the less the distance of the couple
(x, y) to the technology frontier, the more the efficiency). The directional
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distance function introduced by Chambers, Chung and Fa¨re (1996, 1998) is
expressed as, for a single firm k,
DT (x
k, yk; g) = sup
δ
{
δ ∈ R : (xk − δgi, yk + δgo) ∈ T k
}
, (2.3)
which gauges input and output variation in the direction of a pre-assigned
vector g = (gi, go) ∈ Rn+m+ . In the sequel, the directional distance func-
tion is such that DT (x
k, yk; g) ≥ 0, i.e., the cases of infeasibilities for which
(xk, yk) /∈ T k are not reported. For a group of |S| firms with technology T S ,
the technical aggregation bias is defined as follows (see Briec and Mussard,
2014):
AB(S; g) := DTS
(∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
−
∑
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g). (2.4)
It provides the loss of technical efficiency due to the cooperation between the
firms of group S, for any given S ⊆ K. The aggregation bias may be null.
In this case, the exact aggregation condition is,
DTS
(∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
=
∑
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g). (2.5)
Under the assumptions (T1)-(T4), the exact aggregation is possible whenever
T S =
∑
k∈S T
k:
(i) if the technologies T k are identical and the input set is one-dimensional;
(ii) or if the firms use the same technique and (T5) holds.2
In this paper, we are particularly interested in the impossibility related
to directional distance functions: the collaboration between firms cannot
improve the technical efficiency of the firm group. This impossibility was
proven independently by Briec et al. (2003) and Fa¨re, Grosskopf and Ze-
lenyuk (2008). Their result, which may be formalized as AB(K) ≥ 0, pro-
vides the loss of technical efficiency due to cooperation. In other words, the
distance of the group is, for any given type of technology, always greater than
the sum of the individual distances. The same conclusion holds true for all
possible coalitions S ⊆ K, AB(S) ≥ 0. This result reports a sub-efficiency
inherent to the cooperation between firms in a cost-sharing problem (in which
cooperation never reduces the cost of technical inefficiency).3 The problem
2If the firms of coalition S use the same technique, then T 1 = · · · = T |S| such that, for
all k ∈ S, xki = αi,jxkj , ykm = βm,nykn and ykm = γm,ixki , with αi,j , βl,q, γl,i constants for
i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and l, q ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
3It is noteworthy that technology sets are represented by distance functions (primal
representation) and also by cost functions (dual representations).
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of sub-efficiency is inherent to the standard additive form of the aggrega-
tion of production vectors. To be precise, the measurement of technical
efficiency and its bias may depend on particular aggregators of input/output
vectors that confer the technology some particular algebraic structures such
as semilattice technologies studied in Section 4. These production technolo-
gies exhibit either output or input (weak) complementarity. Accordingly, it
is shown that the impossibility of improving technical efficiency does not hold
any more (Section 5).
3 Aggregated Technologies: Definitions and
Examples
Andriamasy et al. (2017) investigate the characterization of the limits of gen-
eralized convex technologies dealing with Constant-Elasticity-Substitution
and Constant-Elasticity-Transformation (CES-CET) models.4 In what fol-
lows, generalized convex technologies are presented thanks to power func-
tions. Some examples show that the directional distance function applied to
aggregated data is relevant to negative technical bias for these technologies.
3.1 Power Functions
For all α ∈ (0,+∞), let φα : R −→ R be the map defined by:
φα(λ) =
{
λα if λ ≥ 0
−|λ|α if λ ≤ 0. (3.1)
For all α 6= 0, the reciprocal map is φ−1α := φ 1
α
. It is first quite straightforward
to state that: (i) φα is defined over R+; (ii) φα is continuous over R+; (iii) φα
is bijective over R+. Throughout the section, for any vector z = (z1, . . . , zd) ∈
Rd+ we use the following notations:
Φα(z) =
(
φα(z1), . . . , φα(zd)
)
. (3.2)
It is then natural to introduce the following algebraic operation over Rd+:
z
α
+ u = Φ−1α
(
Φα(z) + Φα(u)
)
and λ
α· z = Φ−1α (φα(λ)Φα(z)) . (3.3)
In this case (φα(R),+, ·) is a scalar field since φα(R) = R.
Let us focus on the case α ∈ (−∞, 0). The map λ 7→ λα is not defined at
point λ = 0. Thus, it is not possible to construct a bijective endomorphism
4On this ground, Ravelojaona (2019) introduces a generalized directional distance func-
tions for the measurement of technical efficiency based on transformed data.
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on R. However, it is possible to construct an operation preserving at least
associativity. For all α ∈ (−∞, 0) we consider the function φα defined by:
φα(λ) =

λα if λ > 0
−(|λ|)α if λ < 0
+∞ if λ = 0.
(3.4)
In such a case M := φα(R) = R\{0}∪{+∞}. Moreover, let us construct the
application Φα : Rd −→Md, defined by Φα(z1, . . . , zd) = (φα(z1), . . . , φα(zd)).
For all α < 0, the algebraic operators
α
+ and
α· are also defined by:
z
α
+ u = Φα
−1 (Φα(z) + Φα(u)) and λ
α· z = Φα−1 (φα(λ) · Φα(z)) . (3.5)
In such a case (R,
α
+,
α·) is not a scalar field because there is not a neutral
element. Notice that (R,
α
+,
α·) admits 0 as an absorbing element. It is easy
to check that for all λ ∈ R, 0 α+ λ = 0. This comes from the fact that for
all µ ∈ M , µ +∞ = ∞ ∈ M . Thus
(
Rd,
α
+,
α·
)
is not a Φα-vector space.
However, the addition
α
+ is well defined over Rd and it is trivial to check that
associativity holds.
3.2 Definitions
According to the properties of the power function, let us investigate the
Φα-aggregator introduced by Ben-Tal (1977). For all z = (x, y) ∈ Rd+, an
one-dimensional aggregator is given by:
φα∑
j∈[d]
zj :=
{
φ−1α
(∑
j∈[d] φα(zj)
)
∀α 6= 0∏
j∈[d] zj α = 0.
(3.6)
In particular, if α < 0,
φα∑
j∈[d]
zj =
{
φ−1α
(∑
j∈[d] φα(zj)
)
if minj zj > 0
0 if minj zj = 0.
(3.7)
In order to aggregate technologies, i.e. input/output vectors, the aggrega-
tion is made dimension by dimension, taking recourse to the Φα-aggregator.
Definition 3.1 – Φα-Aggregator – Let Φα : Rd+ −→ Md+ defined for all
α ∈ R such that Φα(z1, . . . , zd) = (φα(z1), . . . , φα(zd)). For all collections
Z := {zk : k ∈ S} ∈ Rd+, the Φα-aggregator is:
Φα∑
k∈S
zk :=
(
φα∑
k∈S
zk1 , . . . ,
φα∑
k∈S
zkd
)
.
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Aggregated technologies based on the Φα-aggregator are defined as T
α
+
T = {z α+ u : z, u ∈ T}. Equivalently T α+ T = Φ−1α (Φα(T ) + Φα(T )). For
several firms k ∈ S, with different technologies, the aggregated technology of
coalition S is defined as follows.
Definition 3.2 – Φα-Aggregated technologies – For all aggregator Φα :
Rn+m+ −→Mn+m+ , an aggregated technology T SΦα is, for all S ⊆ K and |S| ≥ 2,
T SΦα :=
Φα∑
k∈S
T k. (3.8)
When α = 0, a multi-output Cobb-Douglas technology is designed i.e. the
product of input vectors provides a multidimensional output, see Andriamasy
et al. (2017). When α = 1, the well-known aggregation over sets is obtained,
see Li (1995) and Li and Ng (1995).
3.3 Negative technical bias: examples
The Φα-aggregator enables the technical bias inherent to the directional dis-
tance function to be negative, i.e., the improvement of technical efficiency
of the firm group is due to the cooperation between firms. The technical
aggregation bias is defined as, for all S ⊆ K and |S| ≥ 2,
ABα(S; g) := DTS
(
Φα∑
k∈S
(xk, yk); g
)
−
φα∑
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g). (3.9)
Example 3.1 Suppose that K = {1, 2} and that T k = {(x, y) ∈ R3+ : yα −
(x1)
α − (x2)α ≤ 0} for k = 1, 2. Assume moreover that for k = 1, we have
(x1, y1) = (2, 1, 1) and for k = 2, (x2, y2) = (1, 2, 1). Setting T 1 = T 2, it is
possible to find some α such that ABα(S; g) S 0.
Set T 0 := T 1 = T 2. By construction T 0 is quasi-linear and satisfies the
constant returns to scale assumption (T5), then:
Φα∑
k=1,2
T kα = T
0.
Setting g = (1, 1, 0), we have DT 0(2, 1, 1; 1, 1, 0) = 1 and DT 0(1, 2, 1; 1, 1, 0) =
1. It follows that:
α∑
k=1,2
DTkα (x
k, yk; 1, 1, 0) =
(
(DT 0(2, 1, 1; 1, 1, 0))
α+(DT 0(1, 2, 1; 1, 1, 0))
α) 1α = 2 1α .
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Moreover,
Φα∑
k=1,2
(xk, yk) =
(
(2α+1α)
1
α , (1α+2α)
1
α , (1α+1α)
1
α
)
=
(
(1+2α)
1
α , (1+2α)
1
α , 2
1
α
)
.
The input set is by definition L0(2
1
α ) = {(x1, x2) ∈ R2+ : (x1)α+(x2)α ≥ 2
1
α}.
It follows that:
DTSα
( Φα∑
k=1,2
(xk, yk); 1, 1, 0
)
= DTSα
(
(1+2α)
1
α , (1+2α)
1
α , 2
1
α ; 1, 1, 0
)
= (1+2α)
1
α−1.
Thus,
ABα = (1 + 2
α)
1
α − 1− 2 1α .
• If α = 1, we have
ABα = 3− 1− 2 = 0.
• If α = 1/2, we have
ABα = (1 +
√
2)2 − 1− 22 = (1 +
√
2)2 − 5 > 0.
• If α = 2, we have
ABα =
√
5− 1−
√
2 < 0.
It is also possible to show, when α = 0, that the technical bias is either
positive or negative.
Example 3.2 Let z2 := (x2, y2) = 1 d and S a coalition of two firms, k =
1, 2, such that T Sα = T
1
α. Setting α = 0, it can be shown that AB0(S; g) S 0.
For α = 0,
AB0(S; g) = DTS0
(∏
k=1,2
zk; g
)
−DT 10
(
z1; g
) ·DT 20 (z2; g) .
Since T S0 = T
1
0 , it comes that
DTS0
(∏
k=1,2
zk; g
)
= DT 10
(
z1; g
)
.
By definition, DTS0 (·) ≥ 0. If DT 20 (z2; g) T 1 then AB0(S; g) S 0.
shown in Briec and Mussard (2014), if the allocative efficiency corresponds
to a positive aggregation bias, then a coalition S may improve its allocative
efficiency. However, in the transformed space Φ−1α (Rd), the bias is not always
positive as in the Euclidean vector space of dimension d = n + m. Then,
the improvement of allocative efficiency holds true with the Φα-aggregator if
ABα(S; g) ≥ 0.
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4 Nonjoint Aggregated Technologies with Com-
plementarity
In the following, the limit of the Φα-aggregator is investigated in order to
deal with aggregated semilattice technologies being nonjoint technologies ex-
hibiting complementarity either in inputs or in outputs.
In production economics, a complementary output is an output with a
negative cross elasticity of supply, in contrast to a substitute output. This
means that an output supply is increased when the price of another output is
decreased (not weakly). Along this line an output is weakly complementary
if the output supply is not decreased when the price of another output is
decreased. This is typically the case of Kohli technologies, analyzed by Kohli
(1983), where the output set has a cubic structure.
Paralleling this definition, a complementary input is an input with a
negative cross elasticity of the demand factor. Hence an input demand is
increased when the price of another input is decreased. Then, an input is
weakly complementary if the input demand is not decreased when the price
of another input is decreased. For example Leontief production functions
imply input weak complementarity of production factors.
Notice that in the case where the technology is derived from a production
function f : Rn+ → R+ weak complementarity is often associated to super-
modularity. This is defined with respect to the standard partial order over
Rn. A function f is weakly supermodular if f(x∨y)+f(x∧y) > f(x)+f(y)
for all x, y ∈ Rn. If f is twice continuously differentiable, then weak super-
modularity is equivalent to the condition ∂
2f
∂zi ∂zj
> 0 for all i 6= j.
4.1 Semilattice Aggregators
The Φα-aggregator is defined, for all z ∈ Rd+, such that:
φα∑
j∈[d]
zj :=
 minj∈[d] zj if α = −∞max
j∈[d]
zj if α =∞. (4.1)
By construction
φα∑
j zj = φ
−1
α
(∑
j φα(zj)
)
when α /∈ {−∞,∞}. In such
a case, Blackorby et al. (1981) axiomatically characterize this aggregator.5
5It is a generalized quasi-linear function that respects continuity, monotonicity, sepa-
rability and symmetry.
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This notation is justified by the fact that:
limα−→−∞
φα∑
j∈[d] zj = min
j∈[d]
zj if α = −∞
limα−→+∞
φα∑
j∈[d] zj = max
j∈[d]
zj if α =∞.
(4.2)
In the case where α = −∞, if there is some j such that zj = 0, then
φα(zj) = +∞ and it follows that
φα∑
j∈[d] zj = min
j∈[d]
zj = 0.
Definition 4.1 – Semilattice Aggregators – For all collections Z = {zk :
k ∈ S} ∈ Rd+ an upper-semilattice aggregator is given by:
∨
k∈S
zk :=
Φ∞∑
k∈S
zk =
(
max{z11 , . . . , z|S|1 }, . . . ,max{z1d, . . . , z|S|d }
)
.
A lower-semilattice aggregator is given by:
∧
k∈S
zk :=
Φ−∞∑
k∈S
zk =
(
min{z11 , . . . , z|S|1 }, . . . ,min{z1d, . . . , z|S|d }
)
.
On this ground, aggregated semilattice technologies may be characterized.
4.2 Aggregated semilattice technologies: characteriza-
tion
Sets being semilattices are defined as follows.
Definition 4.2 – Semilattices – A subset T of Rn+m+ is an upper semilat-
tice if for all z, z′ ∈ T we have z ∨ z′ ∈ T . A subset T of Rn+m+ is a lower
semilattice if for all z, z′ ∈ T we have z ∧ z′ ∈ T .
Semilattice technologies are related to B-convex technologies.6
Example 4.1 Let us recall the notion of B-convex (B−1-convex) sets. A
B-convex hull of a set A =
{
z1, . . . , z|S|
} ⊂ Rn+m+ is
B(A) =
{ ∨
k∈S
tkz
k, max
k=1,...,|S|
tk = 1, t > 0
}
.
6Semilattice technologies are either B-convex or B−1-convex technologies, introduced
respectively by Briec and Horvath (2009) and Briec and Liang (2011).
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The B−1-convex hull of a set A is given by:
B−1(A) =
{∧
k∈S
skz
k, min
k=1,...,|S|
sk = 1, s > 0
}
.
The B-convex and B−1-convex technologies are given by:
T Smax =
{
(x, y) ∈ Rm+n+ : x >
∨
k∈S
tkx
k, y 6
∨
k∈S
tky
k,max
k∈S
tk = 1, t > 0
}
,
T Smin =
{
(x, y) ∈ Rm+n+ : x >
∧
k∈S
sk xk, y 6
∧
k∈S
sk yk,min
k∈S
sk = 1, s > 0
}
.
B-convex technologies belong to the class of Kohli technologies. These tech-
nologies exhibit output weak complementarity in the production. Let us re-
mark that the free disposal assumption can be represented thanks to the free
disposal cone K = Rm+ × (−Rn+). In this respect any technology respecting the
free disposal assumption may be rewritten as: T = (A + K) ∩ Rm+n+ . As a
consequence, B-convex and B−1-convex technologies are given by:
Tmax = (B(A) +K) ∩ Rm+n+ ; Tmin =
(
B−1(A) +K
) ∩ Rn+m+ .
Inverse B-convex technologies are related to Leontief production functions and
imply input weak complementarity of production factors. They are, however,
defined in a multi-output context. These are represented in Figures 1a and
1b.
In what follows, the properties of aggregated semilattice technologies are
analyzed:
Φα∑
k∈S T
k =
∨
k∈S T
k if α = +∞
Φα∑
k∈S T
k =
∧
k∈S T
k if α = −∞.
(4.3)
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Suppose that for all k ∈ S, T k is an upper [lower] semilattice. We prove
that the aggregated technology
∨
k∈S T
k [
∧
k∈S T
k] satisfies assumptions (T1)-
(T5).
Proposition 4.1
(i) If for all k ∈ S, T k satisfies the no free lunch assumption (T1), then∨
k∈S T
k [respectively
∧
k∈S T
k] satisfies (T1).
(ii) If for all k ∈ S, T k satisfies (T2), then ∨k∈S T k [respectively ∧k∈S T k]
satisfies (T2).
(iii) For all k ∈ S, if T k satisfies the closedness assumption (T3), then∨
k∈S T
k [respectively
∧
k∈S T
k] satisfies (T3).
(iv) If for all k ∈ S, T k satisfies a free disposal assumption (T4), then∨
k∈S T
k [respectively
∧
k∈S T
k] satisfies (T4).
(v) If for all k ∈ S, T k is an upper [lower] semilattice and satisfies the con-
stant returns to scale assumption (T5), then
∨
k∈S T
k [respectively
∧
k∈S T
k]
is an upper [lower] semilattice respecting (T5).
Proof: (i) Straightforward.
(ii) From (T2) each set A(xk) is assumed to be bounded. Hence, A(
∨
k∈S x
k)
is also bounded, and so,
∨
k∈S T
k respects (T2). The same holds true for
A(
∧
k∈S x
k).
(iii) Let (w, z) = (
∨
k∈S w
k,
∨
k∈S z
k). Assume by contradiction that
∨
k∈S T
k
is open. Hence, there is some w, z ∈ Rn+m+ such that (w, z) /∈
∨
k∈S T
k.
If T k is an upper semilattice, then
∨
k∈S T
k is an upper semilattice. Then,∨
k∈S(w
k ∨ zk) /∈ ∨k∈S T k. Hence, the map wk 7→ ∨k∈S wk is not defined
and not continuous on some intervals, that is, it exists some k ∈ S and
at least one i ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that maxk∈S wki is not defined. Then, for
wk = (x
k, yk) it exists xki ∈ [x¯ki , x¯ki + ] or yki ∈ [y¯ki , y¯ki + ] with  > 0 such
that maxk∈S wki is not defined. In such a case, x
k ∨ yk /∈ T k, and T k is open
on some intervals [x¯ki , x¯
k
i + ] or [y¯
k
i , y¯
k
i + ], which concludes the proof. The
proof is similar for
∧
k∈S T
k.
(iv) Suppose that z = (x, y) ∈ ∨k∈S T k and let z′ = (x′, y′) ∈ Rn+m+ such
that x′ > x and y′ 6 y. We need to prove that z′ ∈ ∨k∈S T k. By hypothesis
one can find (z1, . . . , z|S|) ∈ ∨k∈S T k such that z = ∨k∈S zk. If y′ 6 y, then
there is some v ∈ Rm+ such that y′ = y−v. Moreover y−v = (
∨
k∈S y
k)−v =∨
k∈S(y
k−v). However, y−v > 0m, thus y−v = (y−v)∨0m. Consequently,
y − v =
(∨
k∈S
(yk − v)
)
∨ 0m =
∨
k∈S
[
(yk − v) ∨ 0m
]
.
For all k, since yk > 0m, (yk−v)∨0m 6 yk∨0m = yk. Similarly, if x′ > x, then
there is some u ∈ Rn+ such that x′ = x+ u = (
∨
k∈S x
k) + u =
∨
k∈S(x
k + u).
13
However, since each T k satisfies a free disposal assumption the inequalities
(yk− v)∨ 0m 6 yk and xk +u > xk implies that (xk +u, (yk− v)∨ 0m) ∈ T k.
Hence z′ = (x′, y′) ∈ ∨k∈S T k, which ends the proof. The proof is similar for∧
k∈S T
k except that one should use the distributivity of the operation ∨ on
∧. Suppose that z = (x, y) ∈ ∧k∈S T k and let z′ = (x′, y′) ∈ Rn+m+ such that
x′ > x and y′ 6 y. By hypothesis one can find (z1, . . . , z|S|) ∈ ∧k∈S T k such
that z =
∧
k∈S z
k. Paralleling the proof above, if y′ 6 y, then there is some
v ∈ Rm+ such that y′ = y−v. Moreover y−v = (
∧
k∈S y
k)−v = ∧k∈S(yk−v).
Since, y − v > 0m, y − v = (y − v) ∨ 0. Therefore,
y − v =
(∧
k∈S
(yk − v)
)
∨ 0m =
∧
k∈S
[
(yk − v) ∨ 0m].
For all k, since yk > 0m one has (yk − v)∨ 0m 6 yk ∨ 0m = yk. Moreover,
if x′ > x, then there is some u ∈ Rn+ such that x′ = x+ u = (
∧
k∈S x
k) + u =∧
k∈S(x
k + u). However, since each T k satisfies a free disposal assumption
(yk − v) ∨ 0m 6 yk and xk + u > xk implies that z′ = (x′, y′) ∈
∧
k∈S T
k,
which ends the proof.
(v) Suppose that z, w ∈ ∨k∈S T k. We have to prove that βz ∨βw ∈ ∨k∈S T k
for some β ≥ 0. For all k ∈ S choose some zk, wk ∈ T k such that z = ∨k∈S zk
and w =
∨
k∈S w
k. Therefore,
βz ∨ βw = (
∨
k∈S
βzk) ∨ (
∨
k∈S
βwk) =
∨
k∈S
(βzk ∨ βwk).
By (T5), since T k is an upper semilattice for all k ∈ S, we get that βzk ∨
βwk ∈ T k. Thus βz∨βw ∈ ∨k∈S T k, and so z∨w ∈ ∨k∈S T k. Consequently,∨
k∈S T
k is an upper semilattice satisfying (T5), which ends the proof. For∧
k∈S T
k, the proof is similar.
A last property of equal technology will be useful in the firm games de-
signed below. Inside a coalition, when the technologies of the firms are iden-
tical, the aggregated technology of the coalition inherits the same technology.
Proposition 4.2 The two following properties hold:
(i) Suppose that for all k ∈ S, T k = T is an upper semilattice. Then∨
k∈S T
k = T .
(ii) Suppose that for all k ∈ S, T k = T is a lower semilattice. Then∧
k∈S T
k = T .
Proof: (i) By hypothesis (0n, 0m) ∈ T k for all k. Therefore, for all k,
T k = T ⊂ ∨k∈S T k. Let us show the converse. Assume that z ∈ T . It
follows that for all k there are some zk ∈ T k, such that z = ∨k∈S zk. Since
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T = T k, zk ∈ T for all k. Since T is an upper semilattice it follows that∨
k∈S z
k ∈ T . Therefore ∨k∈S T k ⊂ T . Consequently, ∨k∈S T k = T .
(ii) Assume that z ∈ T . It follows that for all k there are some zk ∈ T k,
such that z =
∧
k∈S z
k. Since T = T k, zk ∈ T for all k. Since T is a lower
semilattice it follows that
∧
k∈S z
k ∈ T . Therefore ∧k∈S T k ⊂ T . Let us
prove the converse inclusion, Suppose that, z ∈ T . Since T = T k for all k,
z ∈ T k. Obviously z = ∧k∈S zk. Hence z ∈ ∧k∈S T k and it follows that
T ⊂ ∧k∈S T k which proves the converse inclusion.
Finally, these properties indicate that aggregated semilattice technologies
respect the traditional assumptions (T1)-(T5) of the literature (we will show
however in the next section that (T5) is not necessary to obtain negative
technical bias). Also, these technologies exhibit multi-input and multi-output
weak complementarity.
4.3 Aggregated technologies and Complementarity
An intuition of the negative technical bias relying on semilattice technolo-
gies (studied in the next Section) is provided. Let us analyze the aggregated
output correspondence
∨
k P
k(x) and the aggregated input correspondence∧
k L
k(y), with α = +∞ and α = −∞, respectively. These technologies are
nonjoint. Nonjointness is characterized either by the intersection of output
sets or input sets, see Chambers (1988) Chapter 7 and Kholi (1981, 1983).
Although semilattice technologies depicted in Figures 2a/b include the in-
tersection of output/input sets, they generalize the notion of nonjointness in
the sense that they exhibit interdependencies between the firm production
in a given coalition.
In the first case (Figure 2.a), given a fixed input amount x, the firm
coalition (dashed line) may reach a better multi-output production (more y1
and more y2). This represents multi-output weak complementarity, in other
terms, the cooperation between firms does not affect efficiency since more
outputs may be produced with a same quantity of inputs.7
In the second case, given a fixed amount of output y (Figure 2.b), the
firm coalition (dashed line) may reach a lower use of inputs (less x1 and
less x2). This represents the multi-input weak complementarity. As can be
seen in Figure 2.b, the lower semilattice technology is a coalitional Leontief
technology.
7These cubic technologies are also relevant to what happens in different states of nature.
In a state-contingent approach, when each dimension represents a state of nature, the cubic
technology provides an evaluation of the production across all those states, see Chambers
and Quiggin (2000).
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It is noteworthy that the previous cases with α = ±∞ are interesting
because: first they characterize new aggregated (semilattice) technologies
with weak complementarity, second this weak complementarity gives rise to
negative biases, that is, improvement of technical efficiency of firm groups.
This second point is studied in the next Section.
5 Negative Technical Bias: Firm Games
Input/output firm games are introduced in order to outline the conditions
allowing for technical negative biases to be conceived with aggregated semi-
lattice technologies.
A transferable utility game, i.e. a TU-game in the direction of g, is a
quadruplet (K, vα,Φα, g), where vα is defined as vα : 2|K| → R+ such that
vα(∅) := 0. The set of all maps vα is denoted Γ, such that vα(S) provides the
worth of coalition (group) S ⊆ K, that is, the directional distance function
of coalition S based on the Φα-aggregator:
vα(S) := DTSα
(
Φα∑
k∈S
xk,
Φα∑
k∈S
yk; g
)
, (5.1)
such that for any given coalition S ⊆ K, DTSα : Φ−1α
(
Mn+m+
)×Φ−1α (Mn+m+ ) −→
R+. The valued solution ϕ(vα) is the pay-off vector of the TU-game (K, vα,Φα, g),
that is, a |K|-dimensional real vector representing the expected improvement
of technical efficiency issued from cooperation.
Some restrictions are imposed on inputs and outputs, for all firms of the
group, in order to identify negative and positive technical biases.
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Definition 5.1 – Input/Output fixed firm games – Let the firm game
be (K, vα(S),Φα, g) for all S ⊆ K.
(i) An input fixed firm game is given by,
I(K, vα(S),Φα, go, x¯) := (K, vα(S),Φα, g) ,∀S ⊆ K,
where xk = x¯ for all k ∈ S and α = ±∞.
(ii) An output fixed firm game is given by,
O(K, vα(S),Φα, gi, y¯) := (K, vα(S),Φα, g) ,∀S ⊆ K,
where yk = y¯ for all k ∈ S and α = ±∞.
(i) In input fixed firm games I(K, vα(S),Φα, go, x¯), coalitions of firms depend
on the possible outputs to be produced whereas the amount of inputs is lim-
ited to x¯ for all possible coalitions. This may arise when firms are constrained
by the amount of their inputs, for instance when a maximum is imposed on
the use of natural resources to preserve biodiversity. blueAs a consequence,
everything happens as if the distance function is output oriented and depends
on the direction go only. In this case, it is possible to interpret the directional
distance as the firm physical output loss measured in terms of the numeraire,
see Peyrache (2013).
(ii) In output fixed firm games O(K, vα(S),Φα, gi, y¯), coalitions depend on
inputs only, whereas the amount of outputs for each coalition is constrained
by y¯, which may represent a production quota. In this case, everything
happens as if the distance function is input oriented and depends on the
direction gi only. The directional distance is interpreted as the firm physical
input waste.
Proposition 5.1 If T k is an upper semilattice (lower semilattice respec-
tively) respecting (T1)-(T4) such that T k = T for all k ∈ S ⊆ K, then
we have, respectively:
(i) [I(K, vα(S),Φα, go, x¯) ∧ (α = +∞)] =⇒ [AB+∞(S; g) ≤ 0].
(ii) [I(K, vα(S),Φα, go, x¯) ∧ (α = −∞)] =⇒ [AB−∞(S; g) ≥ 0].
Proof: (i) If α = ∞, then
Φ∞∑
k∈S T
k =
∨
k∈S T
k is an upper semilattice
whenever T k is an upper semilattice. From Proposition 4.1 this set sat-
isfies the free disposal assumption (T4), and moreover T =
∨
k∈S T
k (see
Proposition 4.2). It follows that the directional distance function is weakly
monotonic on T , that is, (x, y), (u, v) ∈ T such that u 6 y and v > x
imply that DT (u, v; g) ≥ DT (x, y; g). Since this is an input fixed firm
game, we have xk = x¯, for all k ∈ S. Hence, for all S ⊆ K, we have
17
∨
k∈S x
k = x¯. Moreover,
∨
k∈S y
k > yk for all k. From weak monotonicity,
we have DT (x¯,
∨
k∈S y
k; g) ≤ DT (xk, yk; g) = DT (x¯, yk; g). However, since
T k = T , we have for all k ∈ S:
DT
(∨
k∈S
xk,
∨
k∈S
yk; g
)
= DT
(
x¯,
∨
k∈S
yk; g
) ≤ DT (x¯, yk; g) = DTk(xk, yk; g).
This implies that DT (
∨
k∈S x
k,
∨
k∈S y
k; g) ≤ max
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g) which proves
(i).
(ii) If α = −∞, then
Φ−∞∑
k∈S T
k =
∧
k∈S T
k is a lower semilattice. This set
satisfies the free disposal assumption (T4) from Proposition 4.1. It follows
that the directional distance function is weakly monotonic on
∧
k∈S T
k, with∧
k∈S T
k = T by Proposition 4.2. Then (x, y), (u, v) ∈ T , such that u 6 y
and v > x imply that DT (u, v; g) ≥ DT (x, y; g). Since this is an input fixed
game, we have xk = x¯, for all k ∈ S. Hence, for all S ⊆ K, we have∧
k∈S x
k = x¯. Moreover,
∧
k∈S y
k 6 yk for all k. From weak monotonicity,
we have DT (x¯,
∧
k∈S y
k; g) ≤ DT (xk, yk; g) = DT (x¯, yk; g). Moreover, since
T k = T , we have for all k ∈ S:
DT
(∧
k∈S
xk,
∧
k∈S
yk; g
)
= DT (x¯,
∧
k∈S
yk; g) ≥ DT (x¯, yk; g) = DTk(xk, yk; g).
This implies that DT (
∧
k∈S x
k,
∧
k∈S y
k; g) ≥ min
k∈S
DTk(x
k, yk; g) which proves
(ii).
The technical biases inherent to the output fixed firm games are the
following.
Proposition 5.2 If T k is an upper semilattice (lower semilattice respec-
tively) respecting (T1)-(T4) such that T k = T for all k ∈ S ⊆ K, then
we have, respectively:
(i) [O(K, vα(S),Φα, gi, y¯) ∧ (α = +∞)] =⇒ [AB+∞(S; g) ≥ 0]
(ii) [O(K, vα(S),Φα, gi, y¯) ∧ (α = −∞)] =⇒ [AB−∞(S; g) ≤ 0].
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 5.1.
The previous results indicate that the aggregator Φ∞ (respectively Φ−∞)
is relevant with a negative technical bias that embodies an improvement of
technical efficiency in the input fixed firm game (respectively in the output
fixed firm game). Let us investigate whether this result is relevant to the
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core of the firm game. The core is defined as:
Cα :=
{
ϕ ∈M |K| :
∑
k∈S
ϕk ≤ vα(S),∀S ⊂ K
}⋂{∑
k∈K
ϕk = vα(K)
}
. (5.2)
The negative bias is not sufficient to avoid the non-vacuity of the core. For
that purpose, submodular games are investigated. Solutions inside the core
are characterized, so that the core is partitioned either with negative biases
or with positive ones.
The respect of the following standard axioms is necessary.
Linearity : ϕ(γ1vα,1+γ2vα,2) = γ1ϕ(vα,1)+γ2ϕ(vα,2), for all maps vα,1, vα,2 ∈
Γ and γ1, γ2 ∈ R.
Symmetry : for any given pay-off vector ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕk, . . . , ϕ|K|), then
ϕk(vα) = ϕpi(k)(vα) for all permutations, where a permutation is given by
vα(pi(S)) = vα(S) for all S ⊆ K and vα ∈ Γ.8
Efficiency :
∑
k∈K ϕk(vα) = vα(K), for all vα ∈ Γ.
These axioms provide some well-known values such as, among others, the
Shapley value and the solidarity value. The core of the firm game is non void
whenever the game is submodular (see Shapley, 1972).9
Definition 5.2 – Submodularity – For all firm games (K, vα(S),Φα, g),
such that S1,S2 ⊆ K with S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅, the game is submodular (or concave)
if:
vα(S1 ∪ S2) ≤ vα(S1) + vα(S2)− vα(S1 ∩ S2).
In the same manner, the submodularity of the aggregation bias is, for S1,S2 ⊆
K such that S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅,
ABα(S1 ∪ S2; g) ≤ ABα(S1; g) + ABα(S2; g)− ABα(S1 ∩ S2; g). (5.3)
Following Briec and Mussard (2014), the submodularity of the aggregation
bias displays the following interpretation: the loss of technical efficiency due
to the cooperation between two coalitions is no higher than the aggregated
loss of S1 and S2 [ABα(S1; g)+ABα(S2; g)], by taking into account in addition
the loss of their cooperation ABα(S1 ∩ S2; g). It is shown below that the
submodularity of the aggregation bias is closely related to that of the game
vα(·).
8pi is an automorphism, so that the value of the game vα does not depend on how
the players are ordered inside a coalition S, vα(pi(S)) = vα(S). In the same manner, the
imputation of firm k does not depend on its label, that is, ϕk(vα) = ϕpi(k)(vα).
9Although the concept of Nucleolus is not studied in the paper, it could be investigated
and compared with the Shapley value in the case where the core of the firm game is non
void.
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Proposition 5.3 If T k is an upper semilattice (lower semilattice respec-
tively) respecting (T1)-(T4) such that T k = T for all k ∈ S ⊆ K, then
we have, respectively:
(i) [(AB+∞ is submodular)] =⇒ [v+∞ is submodular] ⇐⇒ [
◦
C∞ 6= ∅].
(ii) If min
k∈S1∩S2
v−∞({k}) = min
k∈S1∪S2
v−∞({k}) then:
[(AB−∞ is submodular)] =⇒ [v−∞ is submodular] ⇐⇒ [
◦
C−∞ 6= ∅].
Proof: (i) Let S1,S2 ⊆ K such that S1∩S2 6= ∅. Since T k = T for all k ∈ S,
then:
T = T S1 = T S2 = T S1∩S2 = T S1∪S2 .
Let zk = (xk, yk) ∈ Rn+m+ , the submodularity of the technical bias (5.3)
entails,
DT
( ∨
k∈S1∪S2
zk; g
)
−
∨
k∈S1∪S2
DT (z
k; g) +DT
( ∨
k∈S1∩S2
zk; g
)
−
∨
k∈S1∩S2
DT (z
k; g)
≤ DT
(∨
k∈S1
zk; g
)
−
∨
k∈S1
DT (z
k; g) +DT
(∨
k∈S2
zk; g
)
−
∨
k∈S2
DT (z
k; g).
Note that for R = S1,S2:
max
k∈S1∩S2
DT (z
k; g) ≤ max
k∈R
DT (z
k; g) ≤ max
k∈S1∪S2
DT (z
k; g).
Hence, the game vα(·) represented by the characteristic function DT (·) is
concave, that is, the distance function is submodular:
DT
( ∨
k∈S1∪S2
zk; g
)
≤ DT
(∨
k∈S1
zk; g
)
+DT
(∨
k∈S2
zk; g
)
−DT
( ∨
k∈S1∩S2
zk; g
)
.
To find the previous relation, note that three cases have to be considered:
either the maximum distance vα({k}) is such that k ∈ {S1 \ S2}, or k ∈
{S2 \ S1} or finally k ∈ S1 ∩ S2. The submodularity of the game (distance
function) ensures that the core interior is non empty (Shapley, 1972).
(ii) In the lower semilattice case, we have for R = S1,S2:
min
k∈S1∩S2
DT (z
k; g) ≥ min
k∈R
DT (z
k; g) ≥ min
k∈S1∪S2
DT (z
k; g).
As a consequence, it is easy to show that the previous condition is not suf-
ficient to ensure the submodularity of v−∞. However, if min
k∈S1∩S2
v−∞({k}) =
min
k∈S1∪S2
v−∞({k}) then the submodularity of v−∞ follows,
DT
( ∧
k∈S1∪S2
zk; g
)
≤ DT
(∧
k∈S1
zk; g
)
+DT
(∧
k∈S2
zk; g
)
−DT
( ∧
k∈S1∩S2
zk; g
)
.
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Therefore, the game v−∞(·) is concave (submodular), then in the same man-
ner than (i), the core interior
◦
C−∞ is non void.
The last proposition is interesting since it allows the non vacuity of the
core to be designed with a simple sufficient condition. Indeed, in order to
find coalitions with efficient operation points, characterized by a better ag-
gregate technical efficiency, it is sufficient to test for the submodularity of the
aggregation bias. Moreover, if this submodularity is proven for all possible
coalitions, then the core of the firm game is non empty. However, it does not
tell us the whole story about the sign of the aggregation bias. Indeed, from
the earlier result, it is clear that the core of the firm game is non void and
that the aggregation bias may be positive or negative (Propositions 5.1 and
5.2). To get a clear result about the non vacuity of the core and the sign of
the technical bias, a partition of the core is introduced. The first core dis-
plays the set of imputations ϕ related to a positive bias, which corresponds
to an improvement of allocative efficiency (see Briec and Mussard, 2014, in
the case where α = 1):
CABα≥0 :=
{
ϕ ∈M |K|
∣∣∣∣ ∑k∈S ϕk ≤ vα(S),∀S ⊂ KABα(S; g) ≥ 0, ∀S ⊂ K
} ⋂ {∑
k∈K
ϕk = vα(K)
}
.
The second core yields the set of pay-off vectors ϕ inherent to a negative
bias, which corresponds to an improvement of technical efficiency:
CABα≤0 :=
{
ϕ ∈M |K|
∣∣∣∣ ∑k∈S ϕk ≤ vα(S),∀S ⊂ KABα(S; g) ≤ 0, ∀S ⊂ K
} ⋂ {∑
k∈K
ϕk = vα(K)
}
.
It is obvious that Cα = CABα≤0 ∪ CABα≥0. Consequently, either in the input
or the output fixed firm game, whenever the game vα is submodular, it is
always possible to find a solution in the core interior either with improvement
of technical efficiency or which improvement of allocative efficiency.
Corollary 5.1 If T k is an upper semilattice (lower semilattice respectively)
respecting (T1)-(T4) such that T k = T for all k ∈ S ⊆ K, then we have,
respectively:
(i)
[I(K, vα(S),Φα, go, x¯)∧ (α = +∞)∧ (vα is submodular)] =⇒ [ ◦CAB+∞≤0 6=
∅].
(ii) [I(K, vα(S),Φα, go, x¯)∧(α = −∞)∧(vα is submodular)
]
=⇒ [ ◦CAB−∞≥0 6=
∅].
Corollary 5.2 If T k is an upper semilattice (lower semilattice respectively)
respecting (T1)-(T4) such that T k = T for all k ∈ S ⊆ K, then we have,
respectively:
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(i) [O(K, vα(S),Φα, gi, y¯)∧ (α = +∞)∧ (vα is submodular)
]
=⇒ [ ◦CAB+∞≥0 6=
∅].
(ii) [O(K, vα(S),Φα, gi, y¯)∧(α = −∞)∧(vα is submodular)
]
=⇒ [ ◦CAB−∞≤0 6=
∅].
Proof: Both corollaries are deduced from Propositions 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
The results above about input and output fixed firm games yield the
conditions to obtain either positive or negative technical biases, and also non
empty cores. However, the constraints imposed on the input-output quantity
(x¯, y¯) available in any given sector of the economy may be seen as restrictive
assumptions. Relaxing these conditions, as depicted in Section 6, it is still
possible to show that negative technical biases and non empty core exist.
6 Firm Games and Negative Technical Bias:
An Illustration
An example of firm game is proposed. It is shown that without imposing the
conditions inherent to the input (output) fixed firm games, it is still possible
to obtain negative technical biases and a non empty core. Let us assume four
firms with the following technologies:
T 1 = {(x, y) ∈ R2+ : y 6 x},
T 2 = {(x, y) ∈ R2+ : y 6 2x},
T 3 = T 2,
T 4 = {(x, y) ∈ R2+ : y 6 3x}.
The input-output vectors are (x1, y1) = (2, 1), (x2, y2) = (1, 1), (x3, y3) =
(1, 2) and (x4, y4) = (2, 0). Taking g = (0, 1) we have DT 1(x
1, y1; g) = 1,
DT 2(x
2, y2; g) = 1, DT 3(x
3, y3; g) = 0, DT 4(x
4, y4; g) = 6.
• If the size of the coalition is |S| = 1, then DTk(xk, yk; g) = DTk∞(xk, yk; g)
for all k = 1, . . . , 4.
• If the size of the coalition is |S| = 2, the coalitions are:
S = {1, 2}: T S = T 1 ∨ T 2 = T 2, DTS
(∨
k∈S x
k,
∨
k∈S y
k; g
)
= 3 and
AB∞(S; g) = 2.
S = {1, 3}: T S = T 1 ∨ T 3 = T 3, DTS
(∨
k∈S x
k,
∨
k∈S y
k; g
)
= 2 and
AB∞(S; g) = 1.
S = {1, 4}: T S = T 1 ∨ T 4 = T 4, DTS
(∨
k∈S x
k,
∨
k∈S y
k; g
)
= 5 and
AB∞(S; g) = −1.
S = {2, 3}: T S = T 2 ∨ T 3 = T 2, DTS
(∨
k∈S x
k,
∨
k∈S y
k; g
)
= 0 and
ABα(S; g) = 0.
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S = {2, 4}: T S = T 2 ∨ T 4 = T 4, DTS
(∨
k∈S x
k,
∨
k∈S y
k; g
)
= 5 and
AB∞(S; g) = −1.
S = {3, 4}: T S = T 3 ∨ T 4 = T 4, DTS
(∨
k∈S x
k,
∨
k∈S y
k; g
)
= 4 and
AB∞(S; g) = −2.
• If the size of the coalition is |S| = 3, the coalitions are:
S = {1, 2, 3}: T S = T 1 ∨ T 2 ∨ T 3 = T 3, DTS
(∨
k∈S x
k,
∨
k∈S y
k; g
)
= 2
and AB∞(S; g) = 1.
S = {1, 2, 4}: T S = T 1 ∨ T 2 ∨ T 4 = T 4, DTS
(∨
k∈S x
k,
∨
k∈S y
k; g
)
= 5
and AB∞(S; g) = −1.
S = {1, 3, 4}: T S = T 1 ∨ T 3 ∨ T 4 = T 4, DTS
(∨
k∈S x
k,
∨
k∈S y
k; g
)
= 4
and AB∞(S; g) = −2.
S = {2, 3, 4}: T S = T 2 ∨ T 3 ∨ T 4 = T 4, DTS
(∨
k∈S x
k,
∨
k∈S y
k; g
)
= 4
and AB∞(S; g) = −2.
• If the size of the coalition is |S| = 4, the grand coalitions is obtained:
K = {1, 2, 3, 4}: TK = T 1∨T 2∨T 3∨T 4 = T 4, DTK
(∨
k∈S x
k,
∨
k∈S y
k; g
)
=
4 and AB∞(K; g) = −2.
This example shows that many coalitions exhibit some improvement of
technical efficiency (negative bias). Now, using a concept solution of cooper-
ative game, the Shapley value, it is shown that the solution lies in the core
of the game:
Shk :=
∑
S⊆K\{k}
(|K| − 1− |S|)!|S|!
|K|! ×DTS∪{k}
 ∨
j∈S∪{k}
xj,
∨
j∈S∪{k}
yj; g
−DTS
(∨
j∈S
xj,
∨
j∈S
yj; g
) .
The Shapley value yields the contribution of each firm to the overall efficiency
of the grand coalition K:
Sh1 = 0.6667,
Sh2 = 0.3333,
Sh3 = −0.6667,
Sh4 = 3.6667.
It can be checked that (efficiency rule):
∑
k∈K
Shk = DTK
(∨
k∈S
xk,
∨
k∈S
yk; g
)
= 4.
Note that the negative score of firm 3 (Sh3 = −0.6667) outlines its efficiency
i.e. its expected efficiency in joining any given coalition, in other words its
ability to improve technical efficiency when merging with other firms. This
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is relevant since firm 3 is the unique firm being efficient DT 3((x
3, y3); g) = 0.
The solution lies in the core, indeed individual and collective rationalities are
respected. Individual rationality is respected: Shk ≤ DTk(xk, yk; g) for all
k = 1, . . . , 4. Also, collective rationality is matched since
∑
k∈S Shk ≤ DTS (·)
for all S ⊂ K.
This example allows one to learn more about cooperation. For instance
group S = {1, 2} is not group-efficient in the sense that the technical bias
is positive AB∞({1, 2}; g) = 2. Firm 1 is capable to produce 1 with 2
inputs, whereas firm 3 produces 2 with 1 input. Then, it makes sense
to predict that moving from coalition {1, 2} to coalition {1, 2, 3} will im-
prove technical efficiency. This is exactly the case since the bias is lower:
AB∞({1, 2, 3}; g) = 1 ≤ AB∞({1, 2}; g) = 2. However, in the case of the
standard sum (α = 1) the result is not intuitive because the bias remains
constant AB1({1, 2, 3}; g) = AB1({1, 2}; g) = 2.
As pointed out by a referee, the previous approach combines two types
of effects. It mixes the effect of the firm’s relative efficiency with that of
the firm’s technology after merging. As a consequence, the Shapley contri-
butions computed above, i.e. the contributions of the expected efficiency
of each firm to the overall amount of efficiency of the group, must be cau-
tiously interpreted. Indeed, a firm may be very inefficient but may have
a comparatively advanced technology or it may be relatively efficient but
with a comparatively inferior technology. Then, after merging with others,
firm coalitions produce effects that depend on the aggregate technology as
well as on the firm’s relative efficiency. In order to disentangle these two
components, it is possible to take recourse to the well-known Luenberger
productivity indicator.10 The Luenberger indicator based on the directional
distance function is given by:
Lt,t+1(xt, yt, xt+1, yt+1; g) :=
1
2
[
DtT (xt, yt; g)−DtT (xt+1, yt+1; g)
]
(6.1)
+
1
2
[
Dt+1T (xt, yt; g)−Dt+1T (xt+1, yt+1; g)
]
,
where t and t+1 denote time t and t+1, respectively. The first term in bracket
yields the improvement (decline) of productivity inherent to technology at
time t when it is positive (negative). The second term in bracket yields the
improvement (decline) of productivity due to technology at time t+ 1 when
it is positive (negative). Assuming that the gap between time t and t + 1
corresponds to the time necessary to join a coalition, then it is possible to
measure the components of efficiency change and technical change inherent
to the cooperation. For instance, if we assume that firm 4 is alone at time t
10See Caves et al. (1982) for an analogous decomposition of the Malmquist index.
24
(with technology T 4) and that it joins the grand coalition at time t+ 1 (with
technology TK), then the Luenberger indicator of firm 4 is given by:
Lt,t+14 (x
4
t , y
4
t , x
4
t+1, y
4
t+1; g) =
1
2
[
DT 4(x
4
t , y
4
t ; g)−DT 4
( ∨
j∈K
xjt+1,
∨
j∈K
yjt+1; g
)]
+
1
2
[
DTK(x
4
t , y
4
t ; g)−DTK
( ∨
j∈K
xjt+1,
∨
j∈K
yjt+1; g
)]
.
It is decomposable into two components as follows:
Lt,t+14 (x
4
t , y
4
t , x
4
t+1, y
4
t+1; g) =
[
DT 4(x
4
t , y
4
t ; g)−DTK
( ∨
j∈K
xjt+1,
∨
j∈K
yjt+1; g
)]
+
1
2
[
DTK
( ∨
j∈K
xjt+1,
∨
j∈K
yjt+1; g
)−DT 4( ∨
j∈K
xjt+1,
∨
j∈K
yjt+1; g
)
+DTK(x
4
t , y
4
t ; g)−DT 4(x4t , y4t ; g)
]
.
The first term in bracket yields the efficiency change and the second one the
technical change. The result of the productivity decomposition of firm 4 is:
Lt,t+14 (x
4
t , y
4
t , x
4
t+1, y
4
t+1; g) = [6− 4] +
1
2
[4− 4 + 6− 6] = 2.
Firm 4 is the least efficient with DT 4(x
4
t , y
4
t ; g) = 6. Its Shapley value is
3.6667, which indicates that firm 4 may improve its technical efficiency when
it contemplates doing all possible coalitions with the other firms. When we
simulate that firm 4 joins the grand coalition only, the indicator is positive
(2), consequently there is an improvement of productivity. The Luenberger
indicator shows that the efficiency change amounts to 2 whereas the technical
change is valued to be 0. This means that the overall productivity indicator
of 2 is only due to the efficiency change. There is no effect of technical change
because, in this illustration, it is apparent that T 4 = TK. As a consequence,
it is always possible to know whether the cooperation between firms is due
to efficiency change or technical change. The productivity decomposition of
firm 1 is given by:
Lt,t+11 (x
1
t , y
1
t , x
1
t+1, y
1
t+1; g) = [1− 4] +
1
2
[4− 0 + 5− 1] = 1.
Its efficiency change is negative showing that when joining the grand coalition
firm 1 loses some efficiency (−3), however it takes benefit from the technology
of the grand coalition so that its technical change is positive (4). For firm 2,
we have an overall decrease of productivity:
Lt,t+12 (x
2
t , y
2
t , x
2
t+1, y
2
t+1; g) = [1− 4] +
1
2
[4− 2 + 2− 1] = −1.5.
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There is a negative efficiency change (−3) with an increase of technical change
(1.5). For firm 3, a decrease of productivity is also recorded:
Lt,t+13 (x
3
t , y
3
t , x
3
t+1, y
3
t+1; g) = [0− 4] +
1
2
[4− 2 + 1− 0] = −2.5.
The examples above show that the gain/loss of cooperation can be decom-
posed to explain the increase/decrease of productivity when any firm joins
one given coalition. It is noteworthy that this decomposition is possible
whenever infeasibility does not occur, see Briec and Kerstens (2009).
Another possibility would be to apply the Shapley value on the Luen-
berger indicator as the characteristic function of the game. In this case, it
is possible to take into account the fact that one firm may join all possible
coalitions. For firm k, we would obtain:
Shk(L
t,t+1
k ) :=
∑
S⊆K\{k}
(|K| − 1− |S|)!|S|!
|K|! ×[
Lt,t+1k
(
xkt , y
k
t ,
∨
j∈S∪{k}
xjt+1,
∨
j∈S∪{k}
yjt+1; g
)− Lt,t+1k (xkt , ykt ,∨
j∈S
xjt+1,
∨
j∈S
yjt+1; g
)]
.
This would provide, by the use of the decomposability property of the Luen-
berger indicator into two terms, the expected contribution of each firm of the
efficiency change and that of the technical change to the overall efficiency of
the group.11
If the Shapley value is applied to the aggregation bias as the characteristic
function of the game, this would yield the ability to interpret the result as
costs or savings games,
Shk(ABα) :=
∑
S⊆K\{k}
(|K| − 1− |S|)!|S|!
|K|! · [ABα(S ∪ {k}; g)− ABα(S; g)] ,
in which it is measured either the expected savings of technical efficiency of
each firm Shk(ABα) ≤ 0 or the expected cost of technical efficiency of each
firm Shk(ABα) ≥ 0.
Finally, theoretical findings must be associated with real world applica-
tions. For this purpose, it is important to show the relevance of our approach
to DEA frameworks. After aggregating inputs and outputs over each group,
it is possible to compute the directional distance function with standard lin-
ear programming. Another option is to use the non-linear distance function
11See also Mussard et al. (2006) for the application of the Shapley value to linearly
decompose the Malmquist index into two components.
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introduced by Ravelojaona (2019) for CES-CET technologies. With a pre-
assigned vector g = (gi, go) ∈ Rn+m+ and for (semilattice) aggregated inputs
and outputs vectors (xS , yS) ∈ Rn+m+ , it is given by:
DTS (xS , yS ; g) = sup
δ
{
δ ∈ R : (xS
α
+ (−δgi), yS
α
+ δgo) ∈ T S
}
.
With linear programming, it is estimated as follows:
DTS (xS , yS ; g) = max δ
s.t. xαS,i0 − δαgαi ≥
∑
k
θkx
α
S,ik
yαS,j0 + δ
αgαo ≤
∑
k
θky
α
S,jk∑
k
θk = 1 ; δ, θk ≥ 0.
7 Conclusion
The improvement of (the aggregated) technical efficiency of a group of firms
has been shown to be possible for a suitable class of of aggregators. The ag-
gregation bias may be negative and the result belongs to the core interior of
the firm game. This approach generalizes the firm game, introduced by Briec
and Mussard (2014), which was defined for the standard sum of technology
sets. The aggregation bias, issued from the Φα-aggregator, takes different
values: positive, negative or zero. Then, the cooperation between firms en-
tails all possible cases, especially with aggregated semilattice technologies
that respect the desirable assumptions (T1)-(T5).
Our result can be extended to DEA frameworks to check the convergence
rate of the Φα-aggregator. It is possible to show that the aggregation bias
may be negative for technology sets associated with values of α that do not
necessarily tend to infinity.
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